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BENIGN RACIAL QUOTAS IN PUBLIC HOUSING:
BURNEY v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE
COUNTY OF BEAVER
When Congress passed the Fair Housing Act' in 1968, many be-
lieved that ending racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing
would help to eliminate segregated communities.2 Several city officials
and public housing authorities believe, however, that nondiscrimina-
tory housing practices may lead to a substantial increase in the percent-
age of minority group members in an area, stimulating white flight and
resulting in a resegregated, all-minority community.3 In order to
maintain integration, planners sometimes use race conscious programs,
such as benign steering or racial quotas, in an attempt to limit the pro-
portion of minority group members in the community.4 In Burney v.
Housing Authority of the County of Beaver,5 a federal district court held
that by selecting tenants for public housing on the basis of their race, a
local housing authority violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment because these selection procedures intentionally dis-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
2. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968) (comments by Senator Mondale that "the
rapid, block-by-block expansion of the ghetto will be slowed and replaced by truly inte-
grated and balanced living patterns" if housing discrimination becomes illegal).
3. See, e.g., Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1124 (2d Cir.
1973) (city claims that adherence to own regulation would create non-white "pocket
ghetto"); 114 CONG. REc. 3421 (1968) (statement of Senator Mondale that real estate
brokers "fear the loss of listings, of buyers or of tenants if they are known to sell or lease
to Negroes..."). See generally Note, Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Valid-
ity of Race-Conscious Government Policies to Promote Residential Integration, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 938 (1980).
4. Park Forest South, Illinois and Shaker Heights, Ohio have benign steering pro-
grams that encourage blacks to move into predominantly white areas and vice versa.
Note, supra note 3, at 945-46. A proposed racial quota plan in Oak Park, Illinois would
have prohibited blacks from buying rent property on certain blocks where blacks al-
ready owned 30% of the property. The village eventually rejected the proposal. Note,
The Use of Racial Housing Quotas to Achieve Integrated Communities: The Oak Park
Approach, 6 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 164, 164-65 (1975).
5. 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 735 F.2d 113 (3d
Cir. 1984).
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criminated on the basis of race and because the selection plan was not
necessary and precisely tailored to achieve the goal of providing inte-
grated public housing.6 The court also held that the plan violated the
Fair Housing Act because of its racially discriminatory impact and be-
cause the Housing Authority could have used less discriminatory
means to reach its goal.7
Under a 1975 consent order with the Pennsylvania Human Rights
Commission, the Housing Authority of Beaver County established a
goal of thirty-three percent black occupancy in each of its five housing
projects to desegregate those projects and to maintain a constant level
of integration.8 When the black occupancy rate was more or less than
thirty-three percent, the Housing Authority offered vacancies to mem-
bers of the underrepresented race. When the black occupancy rate was
at thirty-three percent, the Housing Authority offered vacancies to per-
sons of the same race as the departing tenants.9 The plaintiffs were
several black women who were on the Housing Authority waiting list
when they filed suit.10 The district court agreed with their contentions
that the racial quota system violated the equal protection clause of the
6. Id. at 764.
7. Id. at 770.
8. Id. at 749, 752. The 33% figure, according to the Pennsylvania Human Rights
Commission (PHRC), represented the percentage of black residents in Beaver County's
projects. The PHRC claimed that this figure was to change each year, depending on the
demand for public housing by each race. The Housing Authority asserted that the 33%
figure was to remain constant from year to year. Id. at 752. The court found it unnec-
essary to interpret the consent order because the plan was "constitutionally and statuto-
rily infirm regardless of whether the target racial balance is a fixed or fluctuating
percentage." Id. at 753.
9. Id. at 750-51. The Housing Authority divided Beaver County into five districts,
each of which was largely racially homogeneous. Persons applied for public housing in
the district where they lived, which led, for example, to a surplus of black applicants in
District I. Id. at 765. In 1980, only one of the four District I projects that accepted
families had fewer than 33% black residents, which made it very difficult for a black
family to get public housing in that district. Id. at 753.
A person denied housing in one district because of race would have found it difficult
to obtain public housing in other districts because the Housing Authority never fol-
lowed the part of the consent order that required it to look outside of a district for
applicants of an underrepresented race if no suitable families of that race had applied
within the district. Id. at 751.
10. Id. at 748. The plaintiffs in this suit were also representatives for "a class de-
fined as all minority low-income individuals who have applied for public housing with
Defendants and all minority low-income individuals who will apply for public housing
with Defendants." Id.
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fourteenth amendment1 1 and the Fair Housing Act. 12
Federally subsidized public housing began with the Housing Act of
1937.13 In practice, federal housing projects were completely segre-
gated14 until the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.5 In 1962, President Kennedy issued an executive order' 6
that prohibited discrimination in some public housing units. 7 Con-
gress broadened this prohibition in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
196418 by forbidding discrimination in all federally funded programs. 9
11. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment states: "No State
shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
12. 551 F. Supp. at 764, 770. The Fair Housing Act states, in pertinent part, that
"it shall be unlawful. . .[t]o refuse to rent a dwelling to any person because of race [or]
[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race .. " 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (b) (1982).
The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendant's actions violated the Civil Rights Act
of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982),
§ 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1982), and § 5(h) of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1983).
The court chose to consider only the Fair Housing Act and equal protection claims in
its opinion. 551 F. Supp. at 751-52, 754.
13. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937), superseded by Pub. L. 93-
383, tit. II, 88 Stat. 653 (1974).
14. The 1937 Act became law while the Plessy v. Ferguson "separate but equal"
doctrine was still in force. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Local public housing authorities ad-
ministered the projects, and after World War II, all of the Public Housing Authority's
projects were segregated by race. Note, The Public Housing Administration and Dis-
crimination in Federally Assisted Low-Rent Housing, 64 MICH. L. REv. 871, 871-72
(1966). In Chicago, for example, the local housing authority refused to rent apartments
in several projects located in white areas of the city to blacks until 1954. Gautreaux v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1969), afi'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (1962), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1982).
17. The executive order prohibited discrimination in federally owned housing or in
housing procured with federal funding if the government agreed after the date of the
executive order to provide those funds. 42 U.S.C. §§ 101(a)(i)-(iv) (1982). The order
also directed federal agencies to use their "good offices" and litigation if necessary to
end discrimination in existing projects. Id. § 102. See also Sloane, One Year's Experi-
ence: Current and Potential Impact of the Housing Order, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 457
(1964) (article written by Housing and Home Finance Agency attorney discussing po-
tential strengths and weaknesses of the executive order); Note, supra note 14, at 879.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1982). In pertinent part, Title VI states: "No
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
1985]
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Congress passed the Fair Housing Act2" in 1968, and confirmed this
prohibition of racial discrimination in public housing.21 According to
one of its sponsors, one of the Act's goals was to end segregated hous-
ing and assure blacks that they would have equal access to affordable
housing.22 Plaintiffs, therefore, have two avenues by which to seek rem-
edies for discriminatory housing practices: the Fair Housing Act and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Although the United States Supreme Court has implied that a plain-
tiff can establish a violation of the Act without proving intentional dis-
crimination,2" several federal courts have held that proof of
discriminatory intent is unnecessary to establish a Fair Housing Act
violation.24 To illustrate, in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,25 the
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. § 2000d.
19. Note, supra note 14, at 880.
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982). See supra note 12 for the text of §§ 3604(a) &
(b).
21. The Act exempts home owners who sell their own homes without using a bro-
ker, subject to certain exceptions, and owner-occupied dwellings accommodating no
more than four families. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603(b)(1), (2) (1982).
22. Senator Mondale, one of the sponsors of the Act, made several comments about
the value of integration and the groundlessness of white fears about a mass migration of
blacks into their neighborhoods. 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968) ("the rapid, block-by-
block expansion of the ghetto will be replaced by truly integrated and balanced living
patterns"); id. at 3421 ("[e]xperience under the District of Columbia fair housing ordi-
nance demonstrates that the number of Negroes in previously all white areas of the city
is strictly regulated by their ability to pay"); id. at 2278 ("there is a substantial market
of financially able Negroes prevented from buying housing of their choice because of
deeply entrenched patterns of discrimination in the sale of housing in our country").
23. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court ruled that to establish a four-
teenth amendment equal protection violation, a plaintiff must show discriminatory in-
tent on the defendant's part. Id. at 270-71. The Court then remanded the case to the
court of appeals to determine if the defendant had violated the Fair Housing Act. Id. at
271. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's Ar-
lington Heights scrutiny. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
24. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) (dis-
cussed infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975).
Arlington Heights concerned a village's refusal to rezone an area to allow construction
of federally subsidized townhouses for persons of low or moderate income. The village
had zoned the area for detached single-family houses for more than a decade. 558 F.2d
at 1286. The court of appeals gave four factors to consider when deciding whether a
defendant violated the Fair Housing Act: 1) the strength of plaintiff's showing of dis-
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff need only
show a discriminatory effect to state a prima facie case.26 The burden
of proof then shifts to the defendant to establish that his actions serve
"a legitimate bona fide interest."27 In addition, the defendant must
prove that he was unable to use less discriminatory means to achieve
his goals.28 Once the defendant makes that showing, the plaintiff, to
prevail, must demonstrate that the defendant had less discriminatory
means at his disposal.2 9
It is more difficult for a plaintiff to gain redress for discriminatory
housing practices if the plaintiff bases his or her claim on the equal
protection clause. Federal courts closely examine government actions
that explicitly classify persons by race, even if the classifications pur-
criminatory effect; 2) any evidence of discriminatory intent, even if the evidence is insuf-
ficient to prove an equal protection violation under the standard set forth in Washington
Y. Davis; 3) the defendant's interest in taking the action; and 4) whether the plaintiff
seeks to have the defendant provide additional housing or merely to have the defendant
allow someone else to provide that housing. Id. at 1290. The court of appeals re-
manded the case, directing the district court to rezone the land if Arlington Heights
failed to provide another suitable plot of land for subsidized housing. Id. at 1295, 1285.
Arlington Heights eventually agreed to annex some land for public housing to avoid
rezoning the original site. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 616
F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
In City of Black Jack, a group wished to build low- and moderate-income housing in
an unincorporated area that the city zoned for multifamily dwellings. Citizens in the
area incorporated the housing site and the surrounding area into the City of Black Jack,
and changed the zoning ordinance to prohibit the construction of new multifamily
dwellings. 508 F.2d at 1182-83. The city was 99% white, and there was evidence that
"many blacks" would live in the project. Id. at 1186. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that if the plaintiff could show that the defendant's actions had a
discriminatory effect, the defendant must show that his actions were "necessary to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest." Id. at 1185. In effect, City of Black Jack
requires strict scrutiny if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination
in the housing area. See id. at 1185 n.4.
25. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
26. Id. at 146.
27. Id. at 149 ("a justification must serve, in theory and in practice, a legitimate,
bona fide interest of the Title VIII defendant. .
28. Id.
29. 564 F.2d at 149 n.37. The court of appeals in Resident Advisory Board essen-
tially adopted the test for a Title VII violation in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). Griggs held that "[i]f an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."
Id. at 43 1. In addition, Griggs stated that Congress intended to place the burden on the
defendant to show that the practice is related to job performance. Id. at 432. See Com-
ment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 128, 150-85 (1976).
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port to treat all races equally.3" Such actions violate the equal protec-
tion clause unless they can survive strict scrutiny31 or are proper
remedies for past discrimination. 32 The precise standard that remedial
racial classification must meet is unclear. In Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Board of Education,3 3 the Court stated that it would be beyond
the power of a court to order racial quotas in school desegregation
cases unless the quotas were flexible and a court limited the quotas to
eliminating segregation caused by government violations of the four-
teenth amendment. 34 The Court also stated, however, that school dis-
tricts could assign students to schools to make the racial composition
of the schools reflect that of the community in order to teach students
to live in a pluralistic society.3 5
30. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Supreme Court invalidated a statute
forbidding interracial marriages); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (Supreme
Court struck down a statute making it a crime for a black person and a white person of
the opposite sex to "habitually live in and occupy in the nighttime the same room").
31. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (exclusion of persons of
Japanese ancestry from certain West Coast areas was held to be constitutional). Be-
cause actions almost never survive strict scrutiny, one scholar has described the test as
"strict in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
32. See, eg., Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (the Court upheld Con-
gress' 10% set aside of a grant for minority contractors); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (the Court upheld classification of children on the
basis of race to desegregate schools).
In United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), five Justices appeared to ap-
prove the formation of legislative districts based on the percentage of minority voters
within them, in an attempt to ensure proportional representation of minorities in the
legislature. Id. at 165-68 (plurality opinion, joined by White, Stevens, and Rehnquist,
JJ.); id. at 179-80 (Stewart and Powell, JJ., concurring in judgment). One year later,
however, Justice Powell attempted to narrow United Jewish Organizations by stating in
his Bakke opinion that it "properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an
administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previ-
ously disadvantaged group's ability to participate ... " Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 304-05
(1978).
33. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
34. Id. at 24-25. In a companion case, North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann,
402 U.S. 43 (1971), the Court held that a North Carolina law forbidding the assignment
of students to schools by race was unconstitutional because it "would deprive school
authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to the fulfillment of their constitutional
obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems." Id. at 46.
35. 402 U.S. at 16. In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971), a companion case
to Swann, the Court held that assigning students to schools by race to integrate schools
did not violate the equal protection clause. Id. at 41.
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In two later cases, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke3 6
and Fullilove v. Klutznick,37 the Justices were unable to agree upon a
single standard for the acceptable use of affirmative action quotas. One
approach, advocated only by Justice Powell in both cases, was to re-
quire that all racial classifications survive strict scrutiny.38 A second
approach, advocated by four Justices in Bakke and three in Fullilove,39
would require that benign quotas "serve important governmental
objectives and . . . be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."'  Under this approach, so-called benign quotas that bur-
den or stigmatize persons on the basis of race would be invalid.41 Ful-
liove also involved a third approach, in which three Justices held that
all racial classifications must "receive a most searching examination."'42
The meaning of this third test is unclear, although the Justices advocat-
ing its use stated that the racial classification that the Justices upheld
under it in Fullilove could have survived either of the tests that the
Court announced in Bakke.43
36. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, a white male applicant to a state medical
school, whom the school rejected, sued to overturn the school's quota for minority ap-
plicants. The applicant claimed that the "benign" quota discriminated against him on
racial grounds. Id. at 276-78.
37. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, the plaintiff challenged a federal statute re-
quiring that all grantees under the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 spend 10%
of their grants on minority business enterprises unless they could obtain waivers from
the Secretary of Commerce. Id. at 453-54.
38. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). In Bakke, Justice Powell stated, "when a classification denies an individual op-
portunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background,
it must be regarded as suspect." Id. at 305. Moreover, in Justice Powell's judgment,
"he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that
basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Id. at 299.
39. In Bakke, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed on this sec-
ond approach to scrutinizing benign racial classifications. 438 U.S. at 324. In Fullilove,
Justice White abandoned that approach and joined the Chief Justice's plurality opinion
advocating a "searching examination" of racial quotas. 448 U.S. at 453.
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)); see
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519.
41. 438 U.S. at 361.
42. 448 U.S. at 491.
43. Id. at 492. The three Justices who announced this new test in Fullilove-Chief
Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Powell--each had joined a different opinion
in Bakke. Chief Justice Burger had joined Justice Stevens' opinion that stated that
racial quotas in federally funded programs violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 438 U.S. at 418. Justice White joined Justice Brennan's opinion that advocated a
lower level of scrutiny of benign racial classifications. See supra notes 38-40 and accom-
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The Supreme Court has applied equal protection analysis in the area
of housing discrimination. In Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp.,' a suburb enacted a facially neutral
zoning ordinance that the plaintiffs claimed violated the equal protec-
tion clause because of its discriminatory impact.45 The Court ruled
that the plaintiffs had to prove that the village acted with discrimina-
tory intent before the Court would apply strict scrutiny,46 and not the
rational relation test,47 to the village's actions. The result of Arlington
Heights is that it will be more difficult for plaintiffs to prove that gov-
ernmental housing practices violated the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause.48
Several lower federal courts have sanctioned the use of race con-
panying text. Justice Powell alone in Bakke had stated that all racial classifications
required strict scrutiny. 438 U.S. at 290-91.
All opinions comprising the majority in Fullilove stressed several of the same factors
in upholding the racial quota. These included: 1) Congress' broad remedial powers
under the fourteenth amendment, id. at 483, 500-01; 2) the small proportion of federal
construction expenditures involved, id. at 484-85 n.72, 514-15; and 3) the availability of
a quota waiver, id. at 487-89, 514. While Justice Marshall failed to emphasize explicitly
the importance of a waiver, one can infer his concurrence on this point from his state-
ment that only qualified minority firms would be recipients of funds under the quota.
Id. at 521. Without the possibility of a waiver, firms that failed to find enough qualified
minority firms to use would be forced either to use unqualified firms or to lose the grant.
44. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). For a discussion of Arlington Heights, see Comment, Ar-
lington Heights: Planningfor a Segregated Community, 14 URnAN L. ANN. 307 (1977).
For a discussion of later developments in Arlington Heights, see supra note 24.
45. Id. at 254.
46. The Supreme Court has used several different formulations of the strict scrutiny
test. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell,
J.) (the classification must be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (the classification must be
"necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest") (emphasis in original);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (the classification must be "necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective").
47. See, eg., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) ("The constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the state's objective."); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920) ("[tlhe classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike").
48. Cf. 429 U.S. at 265-66 ("[C]ourts refrain from reviewing the merits of [legisla-
tors' and administrators'] decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality
... . Where there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor
in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer warranted."); id. at 270 ("Respon-
dents simply failed to carry their burden that discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor in the Village's decision.").
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scious measures that attempt to desegregate public housing and to pre-
vent "tipping" in housing or schools.49 Tipping occurs when the
percentage of minority group members increases to the point at which
whites will leave or avoid an area, resulting in an area's resegrega-
tion.5 ° In Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High School v.
Ambach,5 ' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after applying
strict scrutiny, ruled that high schools could restrict minority enroll-
ment to avoid tipping the schools, provided that they could show that
such restrictions were necessary to achieve their goal. 2
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority 3 also concerned the use
of race conscious measures to avoid tipping. Otero involved an attempt
by the New York City Housing Authority to disregard its own regula-
tion giving former site residents priority for new public housing that
the city was constructing on the site. The New York City Housing
Authority claimed that if it obeyed its regulation it would tip the pro-
ject and the surrounding area because of the high percentage of minor-
ity group members who were former residents. 4 While the Court of
49. See Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated
and remanded, 449 U.S. 813 (1980), on remand, 664 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated,
457 U.S. 52 (1982) (both Parent Association and Johnson upheld school districts' use of
racial quotas to keep the proportion of minority enrollment in several schools below the
tipping point); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973)
(upheld housing authority's refusal to give previous site residents preference for new
housing built on that site because the housing authority believed that allowing such a
large proportion of minorities into the new project would tip it and the surrounding
neighborhood); Schmidt v. Boston Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1981) (up-
held a plan giving tenants priority for selection if the tenants chose to live in a project in
which their race was underrepresented). For a discussion of Schmidt, see Comment,
Schmidt v. Boston Housing Authority: Racial Classifications in Public Housing, 23 UR-
BAN L. ANN. 343 (1982).
50. See Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30, 31 (1960)
("There is a theoretical maximum minority-group proportion which whites will tolerate
in any area. Once their proportion is exceeded, the whites will flee. The point beyond
which one more minority group member will cause mass exodus is the 'tip' or 'tipping'
point ..... "). The author suggests that a housing authority should only use racial
housing quotas as a last resort to prevent tipping, after such measures as manipulating
the cost of housing, promoting housing to appeal to one racial group more than another,
id. at 67-68, and locating housing in areas away from high concentrations of minority
group members. Id. at 38-39.
51. 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 717-21.
53. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
54. Id. at 1124.
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Appeals for the Second Circuit failed to apply any formal equal protec-
tion analysis in Otero, it held that the city would not violate the former
tenants' constitutional rights by the proposed action so long as the
New York City Housing Authority could prove that by following its
regulations it would almost certainly tip the surrounding area."5
Burney56 also concerned a housing authority plan to avoid tipping in
public housing projects and their surrounding areas. Unlike the court
in Otero, however, the district court in Burney examined extensively
the Beaver County Housing Authority's actions to decide whether they
violated the equal protection clause. It found that the Housing Au-
thority's tenant selection plan demonstrated racially discriminatory in-
tent and therefore required strict scrutiny to determine whether it
violated the fourteenth amendment.57 The plan had discriminatory in-
tent, according to the court, because it selected or rejected equally suit-
able tenants because of their race.58 The court assumed arguendo that
the Housing Authority's interest in having integrated projects was a
compelling governmental interest,59 and stated that the plan would be
constitutional if the Housing Authority could show that it was both
necessary and precisely tailored to integrate the projects.60 The court
ruled that the quotas were unnecessary because the Housing Authority
failed to demonstrate convincingly that the population of the surround-
ing communities would be in any danger of tipping if it stopped using
the quotas.61 The plan also was not tailored precisely to achieve its
stated goals because the Housing Authority failed to show that it ad-
mitted as many black applicants as it could without tipping the
55. Id. at 1136.
56. 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
57. Id. at 757.
58. Id. at 755 ("[lt is the government's denial of a benefit solely on the basis of race
that triggers strict scrutiny analysis.").
59. Id. at 756-57, 764. The court was skeptical about whether the Housing Author-
ity had an affirmative duty to integrate its projects under the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5) (1982). 551 F. Supp. at 769. The court, however, did not elaborate
on this skepticism. Id.
60. Id. at 764.
61. Id. at 766. The plan was also unnecessary, according to the court, because the
Housing Authority's policies themselves had caused whatever potential tipping problem
already existed in the projects. The Housing Authority had divided the county into
districts that were each racially homogenous, leading to a surplus of black applicants in
districts in which they were in the majority. According to the court, tipping would not
have been a problem if the Housing Authority had used a county-wide waiting list. Id.
at 765.
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projects. The court ruled, therefore, that the plan violated the four-
teenth amendment.6 2
The district court also set forth a test for determining whether the
plan violated the Fair Housing Act. First, the plaintiffs had to show
that the plan had a racially discriminatory effect.63 The burden then
shifted to the defendants to show that: 1) The plan served, "both in
theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide [governmental] interest,"
and 2) "no alternative course of action could be adopted that would
enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact."
6 4
The court held that the plan violated the Act because of its racially
discriminatory impact-denying applicants the opportunity to rent
property because of their race-and because the defendant could have
used an alternative plan, such as a county-wide waiting list, to achieve
its goals with less discriminatory impact.6 5
The tenant selection plan in Burney differs from the remedial meas-
ures that the Supreme Court has upheld under the rational relation
test.66 First, those measures were temporary,67 while the county in-
tended6 s the Burney tenant selection plan to be permanent, that is, the
Housing Authority continued to use race to select tenants even after a
project was integrated. 69 The Burney plan is also more burdensome
than the approved remedial plans. For example, in the school desegre-
gation cases the burden consisted of school districts assigning students
62. Id. at 767.
63. Id. at 769-70.
64. Id. at 770 (quoting Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir.
1977)).
65. 551 F. Supp. at 770.
66. See supra note 47.
67. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484-85 n.72 (1980) (the Court stressed the
small proportion of federal construction funding in relation to total U.S. construction
expenditures-.25%-that Congress had contemplated for minority business
enterprises).
68. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
69. There is, however, dicta in Swann indicating that voluntary and permanent ra-
cial quotas to maintain a racial balance in the district's schools similar to that in the
district as a whole are constitutionally permissible. 402 U.S. at 16. Also, if United
Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), still sanctions legislative reapportionment to
assure proportional racial representation in the legislature even in the absence of a prior
equal protection violation, that case would support the use of some permanent and
voluntary racial quotas. But see Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 304-05 (1978) (Powell, J.) (con-
trary interpretation of United Jewish Orgs.).
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to a different school because of race, while in Burney the county denied
public housing to persons because of their race.7° Another major differ-
ence between Burney and the other remedial cases is that in Burney the
burden appears to fall primarily on members of racial minorities,
71
while in the other remedial cases the burden appears to fall evenly
upon all races, as in the school desegregation cases, or upon whites
only, as in the affirmative action case Fullilove.72
Because the racial classification in Burney is insufficiently analogous
to those in the cases containing permissible remedial racial classifica-
tions, it had to survive a higher level of scrutiny than the rational rela-
tion test.73 Based on its reading of Bakke74 and Parent Association of
Andrew Jackson High School,75 the district court subjected the tenant
selection plan to strict scrutiny,76 and concluded that the plan was un-
constitutional because it was neither necessary nor precisely tailored to
achieve an arguably compelling governmental interest. As the court
noted, the number of blacks allowed in a project was unrelated to the
project's tipping point if indeed there were any real danger of tipping in
the projects or in the surrounding area.7 7 The court's application of
strict scrutiny is consistent with the use of that test in other judicial
decisions.78
The Burney court also properly applied its circuit's test for Fair
70. Other remedial cases involve less burdensome actions than those in Burney.
See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (nonminority firms were only
precluded from competing for a minute proportion of federal construction grants);
United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment) (legislative reapportionment in the case did not deny persons the right to
vote, nor did it deny them county-wide proportional representation by race).
71. The original plaintiffs in Burney were both blacks and whites. To "simplify the
issues," before trial the plaintiffs changed the class so that it would include only minor-
ity group members. 551 F. Supp. at 770 n.8.
72. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
73. See supra note 47 for cases applying the rational relation test.
74. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
75. 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979).
76. 551 F. Supp. at 755.
77. Id. at 765-67.
78. The Supreme Court most likely would agree with the Burney court's use of
strict scrutiny. In Bakke, Justice Powell stated that strict scrutiny was appropriate for
all racial classifications. 438 U.S. at 290-91. The Justices who supported a lower level
of scrutiny for the affirmative action quotas in Bakke and Fullilove would likely concur
with the use of strict scrutiny in Burney because those Justices were opposed to benign
quotas, such as the one in Burney, that burden minority groups. 438 U.S. at 361, 375.
In Bakke, for example, Justice Brennan stated that "any statute must be stricken that
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/11
BENIGN RACIAL QUOTAS
Housing Act violations, set forth in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,79
when it found that the Housing Authority's quota system violated the
Act."0 The court found that the plan had a racially discriminatory im-
pact because it denied applicants public housing based on their race. It
also found that the Housing Authority could have used less discrimina-
tory methods to integrate the projects. 8' One such method that the
court did not discuss in Burney, however, is that a housing authority
can provide alternative housing for those denied public housing for
purposes of avoiding the tipping of a project.82
The court in Burney did not ban absolutely the use of racial quotas
in public housing. 3 Rather, the court left open the possibility that a
housing authority could use quotas if it were able to prove that tipping
almost certainly would occur in the near future, and that quotas alone
would prevent it. If other courts share the Burney court's skepticism 84
of whether tipping actually occurs, however, it could be difficult for
housing authorities ever to justify the use of quotas to avoid it. They
will certainly find it more difficult to justify integration maintenance
quotas than desegregation quotas because of the Supreme Court's em-
stigmatizes any group or that singles out those least represented in the political process
to bear the brunt of a benign program." Id. at 361.
79. 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1979). See supra notes 25-29 for a more detailed
description of Resident Advisory Bd. and its Fair Housing Act test.
80. The plan in Burney would be invalid as well under the test that the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit used in City of Black Jack. See supra note 24. That test
is essentially the same as strict scrutiny, except that the plaintiff need only show that the
defendant's actions had a discriminatory effect rather than having to show that his ac-
tions were taken with discriminatory intent. Because the plan in Burney had a discrimi-
natory impact and failed to survive strict scrutiny, it would violate the Fair Housing
Act under the City of Black Jack test.
The plan may also have violated the Fair Housing Act under the test set forth by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in.Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, see supra note 24, provided that the plaintiffs could show that the
plan had a sufficiently strong discriminatory effect. See Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at
1290. Because the court designed this test to deal with facially neutral actions, it is
questionable whether a court should apply this test to a case in which a defendant uses
explicit racial classifications.
81. 551 F. Supp. at 769-70.
82. See Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial
Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REv. 245, 294 (1974).
83. 551 F. Supp. at 764.
84. For an example of the court's skepticism, see id. at 766 ("[w]e recognize that
some courts and commentators have come to regard the tipping phenomenon as a
proven sociological phenomenon ...").
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phasis on the remedial nature of the quota plans it has sanctioned.8 5
The maintenance of quotas that deprive one race access to desegre-
gated public housing could be unconstitutional under the above
standard.
Burney can have far-reaching impact upon the public housing field.
It breaks new ground in explicitly disapproving a desegregation plan
for public housing that involves racial quotas. The decision places
housing authorities on notice that they should carefully design any ra-
cial classifications they use to ensure that the classifications are actually
necessary to promote desegregation.
Elizabeth M. Bagdon
85. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 487 (Burger, J.); id. at 510, 513 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971). The Court in Swann emphasized that racial
imbalance itself is not unconstitutional, stating, "[i]f we were to read the holding of the
District Court to require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular
degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would
be obliged to reverse." Id. at 24.
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